Mud season in Ukraine is restricting troop movements to roads. Armored vehicles, truck transports, etc. risk getting bogged down if they try to go cross country, not to mention the problem of open terrain and drones that make spotting targets easy.
Marco Hernandez and Josh Holder at The NY Times have put together a report with maps, satellite images and diagrams showing how in recent weeks Russia has embarked on a large scale effort all along the current battle lines to build trenches, tank traps, and other obstacles to slow Ukrainian advances, restrict their movements to roads, and prepare fallback positions if Russian forces are forced to retreat.
Trenches are not new to Ukraine. Trench warfare has long been a feature of the battle in eastern Ukraine for the Donbas region. Ukrainians fight from their own trenches on their side of the line near Popasna, where Russians are waging an intense campaign to dislodge Ukrainian troops from the city of Bakhmut.
But the pace and the scale of Russian construction over the last couple of months is unmatched. All of the structures in the image above appeared within six days.
...To better understand Russia’s fortifications in eastern Ukraine, The Times analyzed satellite radar data on physical changes to the earth’s surface. That data, along with high-resolution satellite imagery from Planet Labs, reveals multiple rows of Russian defenses lining major highways just behind the Russian frontlines.
...One network of Russian defenses near Popasna was constructed in just 11 days. Satellite data from Popasna shows new rows of defensive structures snaking north across open fields.
The article is worth a look (the link should penetrate the NY Times paywall) because it gives a big picture look at what’s happening. To provide some more context, a few points.
- As numerous updates here at Daily Kos have pointed out, it’s not necessary to carry out frontal assaults to dislodge Russian troops IF Ukraine can make it impossible to keep them supplied and can threaten to cut off their lines of retreat.
- One of the functions of these new defenses is to make it possible for Russian troops to fall back to prepared defenses if that happens, making a controlled retreat easier.
- As The NY Times article points out however, those fortifications are only useful if troops will attempt to hold them and can fight effectively from them, instead of fleeing in a rout. It takes disciplined and trained troops to manage a fallback effectively.
- There’s also the question of how well these defenses have been constructed, given the speed at which they have appeared.
- As updates at Daily Kos have also pointed out, Russia is faced with trying to hold lines hundreds of miles long. Ukraine does not have to attack along the entire line — it can pick and choose where to attack and when. Russia would then have to get troops and supplies to threatened areas without leaving weak spots elsewhere. Defense is tough. So is staging a counter-offensive given that Ukraine also has fortified defenses — and better equipped and trained troops.
- Trench warfare is a nasty business under the best of circumstances, but rather more difficult when drones, long range weapons systems, and satellite imagery make trenches and the rear behind the lines far from secure. Small drones attacking individuals in trenches from directly above can make the protection of a trench meaningless, as videos coming out of Ukraine have shown.
The big question is what happens once winter sets in and the ground freezes. At that point highways will not be the only way to move heavy equipment. Both sides will potentially have more freedom to move equipment around. Who will do it more effectively, and who will be better able to support those efforts? Who will be able to withstand more suffering and terrible conditions? Will Russia’s strategy of attacking civilian infrastructure all across Ukraine prove an effective counter to Ukraine’s ability to meet Russian troops in the field?
The answers will be written in blood.